Abstract: | Corruption is an important social and ethical issue in recent years. It not only hinders the economic growth of a country, but also could let a country drop into the extinct situation when it grows to the worst. Besides, the importance of sovereign ratings would never be ignored. While the sovereign rating varying, the borrowing ability of a country might also vary. This study utilized samples of the members of Union Nations over 1995-2012 to explore the influence of country leader turnover on corruption and sovereign rating. Finally, this study would categorize the country leaders to explore the influence of different types on corruption and sovereign ratings. This study defined that the leaders who owns the real authorities as the real country leader, otherwise, as the nominal country leader. The empirical results showed that the turnover of the nominal country leader would enhance the degree of corruption after three years. In addition, after taking the country characteristics into consideration, this study found that the nominal country leader turnover would enhance the degree of corruption after two years in the semi-presidentialism system group, and sovereign ratings would be reduced after one year. But, in the real country leader turnover group, it would enhance the degree of corruption after three years. However, under the other types of real leader turnover, it will reduce sovereign ratings. Furthermore, this study divided the samples into several groups by the country development degree. This study found that the nominal country leader turnover would enhance the degree of corruption after two and three years with the extreme development group. But, in the real country leader turnover, it would reduce sovereign ratings after one, two and three years. However, if the real country leader turnover, it would enhance the sovereign ratings after two years with the medium degrees. These empirical findings would provide some suggestions to the management and investors while making international investment. |