家族企業與高階經?人的超額誘因薪酬
  Family Business and the Excess Incentive Pay of Top
Managers

ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 > Item 310904400/63754

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题名:	家族企業與高階經?人的超額誘因薪酬 Family Business and the Excess Incentive Pay of Top Managers
作者:	?命志;蘇欣玫
贡献者:	淡江大學財務?融學系
关键词:	家族企業;代???;管家??;超額薪酬;董監事持股;family business;agency theory;stewardship theory;cronyism;excess compensation;shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors
日期:	2013
上传时间:	2013-08-07 01:33:38 (UTC+0)
出版者:	淡江大學財務?融學系
摘要:	本研究基於家族企業的?大??：代???與管家??，?探討重要的家族企業因素(單一家族控制企業、家族積極性管?與監?)對於公司績效、高階經? 人超額薪酬的激?效果以及董監事治?機制之影響。實證結果發現家族企業因素對於公司經營績效之影響是?明顯的，而正向的高階經?人超額薪酬誘因機制是普遍存在於台灣公開上市櫃公司，但在家族企業中卻相對較?明顯，較支持管家 ??之觀點。其次，董監事的持股愈多時，將有?於公司的營運，然而此正向的效果會在家族企業中相對被弱化。 Based the two different theory of family business including agency theory and stewardship theory, this study analyzes whether firm performance, the incentive effect on top managers excess pay, and the governance mechanism of directors and supervisors are influenced by the important characteristics of family business including single family controlled firm, family management, and family control. Empirical results find that the influence of family business factors on firm performance is not significant. There is generally the incentive effect on top managers excess pay in Taiwan publicly listed firm, but not for family business. We more support the stewardship theory. Furthermore, the higher shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors would benefit firm’s operation. However, the above positive effect weakens in family business.
關聯:	2013中部學術財金研討會論文發表
显示于类别:	[財務金融學系] 會議論文

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