本研究旨在探討公司所有權結構，是否會影響管理當局自願性財務預測的品質，以及自願性財務預測對分析師預測的影響。本文承襲La Porta et al.（1999），以投票權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度，作為代理問題的衡量指標。實證結果發現，公司最終控制股東投票權與盈餘分配權偏離程度較小的公司，自願性盈餘預測較準確。此外，自願性盈餘預測具有資訊價值，可普遍降低分析師預測的誤差與離散程度。最後本文亦發現投票權與盈餘分配權偏離程度較大的公司，分析師預測的誤差與離散程度降低較小。
This paper explores the association among the corporate ownership structure and the quality of managerial voluntary earnings forecasts, and the association of managerial voluntary earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we measure the magnitude of agency problem with the deviation of controlling shareholder’s voting rights from cash flow rights. The empirical results show that when the degree of this deviation is smaller, the managerial voluntary earnings forecasts are more accurate. Furthermore, for firms with smaller deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights, the analyst’s average forecast error diminishes more after managers voluntarily declare earnings
forecasts.
