现有研究表明，大股东会利用其控制权来“掏空”上市公司，从而获取控制权私有收益。本文计量了控制权私有收益的大小，并从股权特征和董事会特征两个方面研究了其对控制权私有收益的影响。研究表明：股权集中度越高、大股东对董事会控制度越高，越容易引发大股东的“掏空”行为，从而攫取控制权私有收益；股权制衡度对“掏空”行为的抑制作用尚未发挥出来，不能有效抑制大股东控制权私有收益的攫取；在大股东单位任职的董事比例越大且董事长由大股东单位派出的两个特征能够使控制权私有收益水平越高。文章建议将股权制衡度作为公司治理的关键和学者们研究的重点。
Current studies have shown that controlling stockholder could obtain private benefits of control through tunning. This study computed the scale of private benefits of control and investigated on how the characteristics of stock ownership and board of director affect private benefits of control. The results show that a) the more centralized the share is, the easier the tunning will be induced; b) the assigning ratio of controlling stockholders and whether the chairman is assigned by controlling stockholder will decide the amount of the private benefits; c) the share balance has not shown effect in controlling tunning. Therefore, this study suggests that share balance should be taken as a key factor in corporate governance and need further research.
