本研究探討董事會特性與異常董監酬勞行為的關係。我們參考金管會區分董監酬勞合理性的認定標準(純益低於同業平均但董監酬勞占純益比例卻高於同業平均)，另發展其他三種認定標準，並依各種認定標準將樣本區分為「異常董監酬勞」與「非異常董監酬勞」兩組樣本。實證結果顯示，依金管會的標準會傾向於將原本董監酬勞未必不合理的小公司認定為異常發放董監酬勞。我們同時發現，公司治理較佳之公司，發生異常董監報酬行為的可能性較低。其中，所有模型的分析結果均一致顯示董監持股具有顯著降低發生異常董監酬勞可能性之效果。
This study investigates how characteristics of corporate boards affect the likelihood of atypical board compensation behavior. First, we adopt the screen criteria set by the Financial Supervisor Commission, Taiwan (FSC) to classify the full sample into a typical and an atypical group. Our results indicate that smaller firms are more likely to be improperly classified as having atypical payouts to their board members by the SFC. Second, we suggest alternative criterion to FSC. In sum, we provide evidence that atypical board compensation behavior is less likely for firms with solid corporate governance features, specifically that, greater the shares held by the board members less likely the atypical board compensation behavior.
