本文探討我國上市公司最終控制股東股權結構是否影響公司進行盈餘管理。我國上市公司的核心代理問題主要來自於控制股東與小股東之間的利益衝突。本文預期，控制股東會透過盈餘管理達到門檻。實證結果發現，代理問題較嚴重的公司，裁決性應計項目較大，並會透過盈餘管理跨越前期盈餘門檻。相較於其它型態的控制股東，具有家族色彩的控制股東較會透過盈餘管理達到門檻。
This study examines the association between ownership structure of controlling shareholders and earnings Threshold in Taiwan. The core agency problem is between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in Taiwan. We expect that controlling shareholder will manipulate for self interest to meeting earnings threshold. The empirical evidence shows that for firms with more serious agency problems, their discretionary accruals are larger. Meanwhile, they tend to manage earnings in order to exceed their prior earnings threshold. Finally, this study exhibits that family-controlled shareholders are more likely to engage in earnings management.
