"本文的研究目的有三：（1）檢測關係人交易，除了過去文獻所主張的利益衝突假說外，是否存在效益交易假說。（2）檢測增加董監事持股，是否可正面修正關係人交易的利益衝突及效率交易效果。（3）檢測較強的內外部監督，是否可正面修正關係人交易的利益衝突及效率交易效果。實證結果顯示，關係人交易同時存在效率交易及利益衝突。董監事持股增加，可增強關係人交易之效率交易效果，亦可正面修正關係人借款及融資對公司經營績效負面的影響。當董監事持股12.5%-25%時，修正關係人財產交易對經營績效所產生的負面影響之效果最強。獨立董監事及四大會計師之查核，對於關係人交易的效率交易效果皆有增強，惟對於關係人的借款和融資對經營績效的影響無正面修正效果，且對於關係人財產交易的也僅有少許的監督效果。
Our research aims to achieve three objectives. (1) To examine whether efficient transaction
hypothesis holds for related party transactions (RPTs) in spite of the fact that previous
researches opine that only conflict of interest hypothesis holds. (2) To inquire what effects,
positive or negative, does increase in directors’ and supervisors’ shareholding have in
association with RPTs. (3) To examine whether strong internal and external monitoring
mechanisms can positively revise or curb the negative impacts of RPTs. The results are (1)
Both hypotheses hold for RPTs, though in different aspects. Our finding diverges from the
popular opinion. (2) Increase in shares of director and supervisor can improve effect of
efficient transaction from sales and purchase of RPTs, and can revise negative impact of
performance from loan or finance of RPT. (3) the effect of efficient transaction of related
party is improved when a company has independent directors or supervisors or the Big 4 CPA
firm. However, independent directors or supervisors or Big 4 have no effect on the negative
impact of performance from loan or finance of related party; and have only a little monitor
effect in property trading of related party.
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