| Abstract: | This article is done through the theoretical and logical analyzing of secondary data, to probe into the current problem of the quality of physician services, and its correlations with hospital compensation management.
In view of preventive and timely treatment to maintain health by the clinical service, there are certain key issues that have brought about potential risks and unsteady quality for the medical serves. A case in this point is that the efficiency of a clinical institution would influence the quality of physician services.
To count this problem, it would be quite necessary to adjust the hospital compensation structure for physicians. Further, due to Taiwan?s employing engagement tendency as a ?closed system?, physicians are paid on the fee-for-service basis. Such commission schemes would habitually confuse and stir up hospital?s capital investment with physician salaries. More often than not, especially when the hospital deploys market-expansion as its main management
objective and strategy, physician?s professional opinion would be jeopardized, and hence risking patients? well being.
In fact, the commission to physicians as incentives would result in the following phenomenon: physicians work over time, too many medicine prescriptions than necessary, inducement of commercialized service, discontinuous diagnosis and clinical services, and disputes on clinical treatment. Consequently, When consumer?s experience are failed and index of quality are limited. would the leading management of the hospital be actively seek professional quality culture, adjust the compensation structure.
This article would also investigate the effectiveness of increasing floating commission in physician fee, and how should a hospital apply risk sharing to reduce each individual employee?s jeopardy under uncontrolled factors. By using Principal-Agent Model, this article attempts to explicate the best possible way to organize a compensation structure, when it was hard to observe and face with the question of stimulation and risk sharing , how to make the optimal effective compensation contract. This article contends the idea that when the physician?s quality input is not balanced and corresponding to treatment output, the floating commission should be reduced accordingly. In terms of organization and medical institution, this article suggests a change on compensation structure that would pave the way for quality service assurance and emphasis on physician service quality from reform the payment system. |
