供應鏈去中間化下製造商最佳風險分享契約研究

ASIAIR > College of Management > Department of Business Administration > Ministry of Science and Technology Research Project > Item 310904400/26224

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Title:	供應鏈去中間化下製造商最佳風險分享契約研究
Authors:	陳世良
Contributors:	管理學院;經營管理學系
Date:	2012
Issue Date:	2013-07-18 07:51:44 (UTC+0)
Abstract:	Arrunada and Vazquez(2006)指出委外代工廠(Contract Manufacturer, CM)雖能為原廠製造商(Original Equipment Manufacturer, OEM)降低人力成本、減少資金需求及提昇生產力，使OEM廠商或買方可集中心力在產品設計研發及行銷等價值鏈等活動，然幫手可能變成競爭對手，在產品售後市場(Aftermarket, AM)與委外製造商一較長短，進而強奪對方客戶。Rossetti and Choi (2008)稱此類委外風險為供應鏈去中間化(supply chain disintermediation, SCD)。供應鏈的委外關係管理，有兩種類型，一為短期且疏遠(arm’s length)的關係，其基本假設為風險轉移，另一為長期且緊密關係，其基本論點為風險吸收，兩種關係差異在於供應商原料生產成本因不確定因素而上揚時，前者關係則由供應商本身自行承擔，而後者是供應商的成本風險由製造商完全吸收。Camuffo et. al (2007)提出製造商在供應商面對成本上升風險下，如何設計誘因契約，誘導供應商致力於降低成本並決定最適風險的分攤(risk sharing)參數。個人在Liu and Chen1 (2010)中延伸此議題探討在雙邊道德危險下，OEM製造商與代工廠商間的最適委外契約，然而這些文獻皆忽略委外風險--供應鏈SCD risk。本研究計畫以代理理論(agency theory)觀點探討汽車零件售後市場，原廠製造商在代工供應商有去中間化的投機行為下，提出風險分享契約以有效治理供應商委外關係。本研究計畫構想截至目前是首例，透過此創新構想預期可達成下列目標： (1) 製造商可透過事前的風險分享契約設計，誘導供應商致力改善成本的誘因及防止供應商投機行為，建立一套具體供應商治理方案，共創雙贏(win-win)的境界。 (2) 台灣汽車零件廠商是全球AM市場重要供應商，因此本研究可對汽車零件供應的鏈協調或治理等學術及實務上有所助益。 Arrunada and Vazquez (2006) indicated that outsourcing the entire manufacturing of a product to contract manufacturer (CM) allows original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to reduce labor costs, free up capital, and improve worker productivity. OEMs can then concentrate on the things that most enhance a product’s value-R&D, design, and marketing. OEMs with profitable aftermarket, however, may find their suppliers (CM) competing directly against them in their aftermarkets. Rossetti and Choi (2008) coined these outsourcing risk as supply chain disintermediation (SCD). There are two opposing strategies within manufacturer-supplier relationship. One is risk shifting with arm’s length relationship. The other is risk absorption with long-term relationship. The main differences are those who should bear the risk caused from the fluctuation of material cost. With risk shifting, manufacturer transfer the risk to the suppliers. Instead, in the case of risk absorption, manufacturer offer supplier a sort of insurance against unexpected variations of production cost. Camuffo et. al (2007) applied agency theory to study risk sharing between manufacturer and their suppliers. Liu and Chen1 (2010) employs a double moral hazard framework to obtain an optimal contract under which both the supplier and manufacturer can exert effort to reduce supplier production costs. However, all of these researches ignore that the influence of SCD outsourcing- risk on the determination of risk sharing parameter in supplier contract. To the best of my knowledge, there are very scare literatures to investigate SCD on the design of supply chain contract. There are many purpose of our innovative study: (1) Through cost-saving sharing contract, manufacturers provide an incentive for supplier to make his effort to reduce production cost or prevent from supplier opportunistic behavior. (2) The supplier of automotive parts in Taiwan are important contract manufacturers in the world. This research will also give a new insight on supply chain contract design and supplier governance relationship for automotive industry.
Appears in Collections:	[經營管理學系 ] 科技部研究計畫

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