本研究主要在測試家族公司的負債決策是否與非家族公司不同，實證結果發現家族公司有較低的負債水準。家族公司集中控制權和風險控管的誘因是影響負債決策的因素，家族控制權與負債比率呈倒U關係，當家族控制持股率低於25%時，家族股東集中控制權的誘因會大於風險控管，使得家族控制持股與負債比率呈正向關係，但當家族持股率超過25%時，控管風險的誘因相對較大，因此會減少舉債，導致家族控制持股與負債比率呈負向關係。This paper investigates whether leverage of family controlled firms differs from that of non-family controlled firms. The empirical results indicate that family firms have relatively lower levels of leverage. There are two main characteristics of families, the incentive of concentration of control and risk controls, are likely to have an impact on leverage decision. Family controlled shareholdings and the levels of leverage are in an inverse U-shape relationship. When the family controlled shareholdings lower than 25%, the incentive for family shareholders to concentration of control will be greater than that of risk controls. Thus, family controlled shareholdings and the levels of leverage are in a positive relationship. But when the family controlled shareholdings exceed 25%, the incentive of risk controls is relatively greater. Debt-financing will be avoided, and family controlled shareholdings and the levels of leverage are in a negative relationship.
