Dividend Policy and Core Agency Problem of Family-Control Firm: Empirical Evidence in Companies Listed in TSE

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题名:	Dividend Policy and Core Agency Problem of Family-Control Firm: Empirical Evidence in Companies Listed in TSE
作者:	Yung-Yu Yang
贡献者:	Department of International Business
关键词:	Core agency problem;Family-control firm;Dividend policy
日期:	2011
上传时间:	2011-09-30 01:48:20 (UTC+0)
出版者:	Asia University
摘要:	Abstract This paper investigates the influence of core agency problem within family-controlled firm on its dividend policy. We proposed and tested two competitive hypotheses: the self-disciplined hypothesis (family-controlled will pay higher dividend in order to reduce cost of external financing) and the agency-cost hypothesis (family shareholder will expropriate minority shareholders by paying less cash dividend). The empirical results show that cash dividend payout by family-control firms are significantly lower than that of non-family-controlled firms. The cash dividend payout of family-controlled firms will be further lower if small proportions of its shares were hold by insider or institution investors. All these results support the agency-cost hypothesis.
显示于类别:	[國際企業學系] 博碩士論文

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