Characters of Corporate governance of Family-Control Firm on its Dividend Policy: Empirical Evidence in Companies Listed in TSE

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Title:	Characters of Corporate governance of Family-Control Firm on its Dividend Policy: Empirical Evidence in Companies Listed in TSE
Authors:	Liu Szu-Wei
Contributors:	Department of International Business
Keywords:	Core agency problem;Family-control firm;Dividend policy
Date:	2011
Issue Date:	2011-09-30 01:48:20 (UTC+0)
Publisher:	Asia University
Abstract:	This paper investigates the influence of core agency problem within family-controlled firm on its dividend policy. We proposed and tested two competitive hypotheses: the self-disciplined hypothesis (family-controlled will pay higher dividend in order to reduce cost of external financing) and the agency-cost hypothesis (family shareholder will expropriate minority shareholders by paying less cash dividend). The empirical results show that cash dividend payout by family-control firms are significantly lower than that of non-family-controlled firms. The cash dividend payout of family-controlled firms will be further lower if small proportions of its shares were hold by insider or institution investors. All these results support the agency-cost hypothesis.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of International Business] Theses & dissertations

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