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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/107259
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Title: | A Study on the Corporate Social Responsibility of Business Operator Behavioral Preferences |
Authors: | Chang, Yu ling |
Contributors: | 經營管理學系碩士在職專班 |
Keywords: | values of top manager;corporate social responsibility (CSR);corporate self-interest;Game Theory;incentive compatibility |
Date: | 2017 |
Issue Date: | 2017-03-08 06:18:09 (UTC+0) |
Publisher: | 亞洲大學 |
Abstract: | The motivation that whether and how to bear social responsibility mainly falls
on the business cost. Along with the homo economic nature and capital profit-oriented,
the enterprise itself does inevitably have the external attempt, plus an imperfect market
system and function not working well at present from Government and consumer
regulation are all difficult to effectively and fully constraint its negative externalities.
So the deviation between the corporate profit behavior and corporate social
responsibility become more and more serious. Thus, how to find out the key factors that
affect the enterprises their choice among the social responsibility and profit &
competitiveness, and then think about the possibility of balancing interests in corporate
social responsibility, become into the main study motivation of this paper. From the
perspective of business operators, based on the theory of corporate social responsibility,
this paper further studies (1) how managers think about the corporate social
responsibility (2) how managers formed to be with the corporate social responsibility
preference. If start from the enterprise operating costs, how managers formed to fulfill
their choice in corporate social responsibility, what factors managers shaped into having
corporate social responsibility preferences (3) how the above both two should be
regulated.
This study, mainly through business operators in the face of fulfilling corporate social
responsibility by using the concept of cost, benefit and game model, analyzes the
forming process of corporate social responsibility preference substitution. In particular,
it is based on the theory of corporate social responsibility to analyze the business
operators in the face of operating costs and corporate social responsibility difficulties,
through the business performance and business self-interest to run through corporate
social responsibility manager preference substitution behavior, and then combine the
enterprise managers with corporate social responsibility performance slumping
problem. Finally concluded that the consensus of CSR (corporate social responsibility)
behavior is based on reliance on management stakeholders against the understanding of
competition and cooperation rules, which should not just involve the relationship
between a certain sort of principal and interest, as well as the social consensus
established in accordance with the common values. Corporate social responsibility to
all stakeholders, should cooperate together to comply with generally accepted norms. |
Appears in Collections: | [經營管理學系 ] 博碩士論文
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